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Security Implications of Russian Energy Policies 
Keith C. Smith* 
 
Russia’s tough stance towards Ukraine on 
natural gas prices was viewed by many in 
Europe and the United States as raising new 
issues concerning Russia’s foreign economic 
policies and growing European and US 
dependency on energy imports. For many new 
EU member states and for countries such as 
Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, however, this 
is an old problem. Central European attempts to 
flag the issue in Western capitals have until now 
been brushed aside. The rapid approval by the 
EU Commission of the Russian-German 
undersea gas pipeline project was a mistake. The 
concerns of the Central Europeans should have 
been examined in more detail. Western 
governments would also be wise to analyse more 
closely the political and security implications of 
Russia’s energy policies. 
 
* Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Washington, D.C. 
(KSmith@csis.org). Ambassador Smith is the author 
of Russian Energy Politics in the Baltic States, Poland 
and Ukraine, published by CSIS in December 2004. 
For a frank statement of President Putin’s thoughts on 
Russian energy policy, he refers readers to RFE/RL, 
“Russian Foreign Policy and Security Watch”, 14 
October 2003, Vol. 4, No. 41. 
Ukraine Has Not Been the Only Target of 
Russia’s Energy Weapon 
There is much more at stake for Europe than its own 
energy supplies. Moscow’s increasing control of the 
energy infrastructure and markets in Central Europe 
has long-term implications for the security, and not 
only energy security, of all of Europe. The comments 
of former Kremlin economic adviser, Andrei 
Illarionov, citing Russia’s increasing tendency to use 
energy as a weapon in its relations with other 
countries, should act as a wake-up call to Western 
governments, and particularly the EU.
4 They can no 
longer afford to be complacent regarding Russia’s 
willingness to use its considerable energy resources 
for political blackmail, a situation that dates back to 
1990, when Moscow cut energy supplies to the Baltic 
States in a futile attempt to stifle the independence 
movement. The ‘energy weapon’ was again used 
against the Baltic States in 1992, in retaliation for 
Baltic demands that Russia remove its remaining 
military forces from the region. In 1993 and 1994, 
Russia reduced gas supplies to Ukraine, in part, to 
force Kiev to pay for previous gas supplies, but also 
to pressure Ukraine into ceding more control to 
Russia over the Black Sea Fleet and over Ukraine’s 
                                                        
4 “Russia: Putin’s ex-aide says he quits because he 
could no longer speak out”, BBC Monitoring, 30 
December 2005.  
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Key Points 
•  The recent ‘gas war’ between Ukraine and Russia does not reflect a policy change in Moscow. 
Russia has used its energy power in an attempt to influence the foreign and security policies of 
its neighbours since 1990. 
•  The European Union and the United States have been slow to recognise that the energy 
policies of the Kremlin are a danger to Europe and particularly to the independence of the 
Central Europeans. These policies are also not in the long-term interest of Russia itself. 
•  The West should pressure Russia to adhere to the Energy Charter and to World Trade 
Organisation principles by making its energy policies and actions more transparent and based 
on competitive business practices. 
•  Ukraine should respond to Russian pressure by developing a crash programme of energy 
efficiency and by increasing domestic production of gas and oil by creating a welcoming and 
transparent environment for foreign investors. 2 | Keith C. Smith 
 
energy infrastructure.
5 Even Belarus, and indirectly 
Poland and Lithuania, suffered supply disruptions in 
2004 from the Kremlin’s politically motivated 
attempt to take over Belarus’ gas pipeline system. As 
recently as 1998–2000, in an attempt to stop the sale 
of Lithuania’s refinery, port facility and pipeline to a 
US company, Transneft stopped the flow of oil to 
Lithuania nine times. None of these examples of 
Moscow’s use oil and gas shipments to strong-arm its 
neighbours resulted in complaints from Brussels or 
Washington. 
Consumption of Russian oil and gas in selected Central 
and East European countries 
  Share of Russian 
crude oil as a 
percentage of total 
crude oil consumed 
(%) 
Share of Russian 
gas as percentage 
of total gas 
consumed (%) 
Germany  31 (2003)  38 (2003) 
Poland  91 (2002)  58 (2001) 
Ukraine  61 (2003)  39 (2001) 
Lithuania  90 (2004)  100 (2002) 
Latvia n.a.  88 (2002) 
Estonia n.a.  100 (2002) 
Belarus 75  (2004)  94 (2002) 
The EU Has for Too Long Ignored Non-
transparent Energy Policies 
Why has the EU, particularly the large gas importers 
like Germany, the Netherlands and France, ignored 
the lack of transparency and competition in Russia’s 
energy sector? The Russian pipeline monopolies of 
Gazprom (natural gas) and Transneft (oil) have been 
given free rides in terms of the open-market 
requirements of the WTO and the EU’s own Energy 
Charter. The EU’s bilateral agreement with Russia on 
its accession to the WTO in effect gave Moscow’s 
increasingly monopolistic pipeline and production 
companies  carte blanche. Russia will be able to 
increase its market power and its political leverage in 
Europe through the construction of the expensive 
undersea Baltic pipeline system. The construction of 
the Yamal II pipeline would have been a much 
cheaper alternative and would have given both 
Central and Western European consumers greater 
energy security.
6 
The West ignored Gazprom’s takeover, with 
Ruhrgas’ help, of domestic gas facilities and markets 
in all three Baltic States. It disregarded Transneft’s 
                                                        
5 P a u l  J .  D ’ A n i e r i ,  Economic Interdependence in 
Ukrainian-Russian Relations, Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1999, p. 78. 
6 “Poland Wants Expanded Yamal-Europe Pipe”, Russia 
& CIS Oil and Gas Weekly, 1 December 2005.  
recent announcement to Kazakhstan that it would not 
be allowed to supply oil to Lithuania’s Mazeikai 
Refinery through the Russian pipeline system, even 
though Astana has the legal right to do so.
7 Russia 
has stopped all piped shipments of oil to Latvia for 
the past two years in an effort to gain control over the 
oil port at Ventspils. And now, Moscow is again 
attempting to keep non-Russian companies from 
buying Lithuania’s Mazeikai Nafta Refinery and the 
port at Butinge. Should not this use of raw energy 
power be a subject for discussion within the EU 
Commission and between the Commission and other 
importing countries such as the United States and 
Japan? 
The West Does Have Leverage with Russia 
It is a mistake for governments in the West to believe 
that they need Russian energy supplies more than 
Russia needs the oil and gas revenue that comes from 
Western markets. Russia does not have the capital or 
technology to develop its vast energy fields without 
assistance from the West. There has been no 
inclination by either the EU or the United States to 
use their considerable leverage to force Russia to 
play by transparent, competitive rules that guide 
business in the West. The pipeline monopolies of 
Transneft and Gazprom are contrary to the Energy 
Charter signed by the EU and Russia.  Where is the 
pressure on Russia to ratify and implement the 
Charter?
8 Following the destruction of Yukos, 
Russian officials declared that private companies 
would not be allowed to build pipelines in the 
country.
9 Yukos had planned to build, with other 
private Russian energy companies, pipelines to China 
and to supply Europe through an oil line to 
Murmansk. 
Former Spies Making Energy Policy 
Russian energy policy is increasing being formulated 
by former intelligence officers (siloviki) in the Putin 
administration and in Russia’s energy companies. 
The head of Rosneft and a former KGB associate of 
President Vladimir Putin helped engineer the break-
up of Yukos and his company’s seizure of the most 
valuable assets of Yukos.
10 Former KGB and GRU 
[Glavnoye Razvedovatel’noye Upravlenie] officers 
                                                        
7 Valeria Korchagina, “Kazakhs Fume over Lithuanian 
Oil Deal”, Moscow Times, 21 November 2005.  
8 http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l27028.htm, 
last updated 13.08.2001. 
9 “Putin may allow private companies to build pipelines 
in Russia”, Prime-Tass, 29 April 2004. 
10 Alexei Polukhin, “1.1 The Gas Secrets Non-
disclosure Agreement”, Novaya Gazeta, No. 94, 15 
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sit on the boards of almost all the country’s major 
energy companies. In 1999, Moscow even sent out a 
former KGB/FSB [Federal’naya Sluzhba 
Bezopasnosti] officer as ambassador to Lithuania, in 
an attempt to provide behind-the-scenes support to 
Lukoil’s negotiating position. Before assuming the 
job, the ambassador had been the FSB’s official 
liaison officer with Lukoil. The siloviki generally 
oppose any weakening of the state through the 
growth of a transparent private sector. Putin’s use of 
a former East German Stasi officer to direct the 
financing of the undersea Baltic pipeline system only 
added perhaps unfairly to the suspicion that the 
project is more politically than commercially 
motivated.
11 The actions of the intelligence sector 
have only set back Russia’s own development as a 
democracy and as a market economy from providing 
long-term benefits to Russia’s own population. 
Ceding Too Much Control to Gazprom 
For too long, Europe’s energy relationship with 
Russia has been directed by only a few member 
states. The role of former German Chancellor 
Gerhard Schroeder in giving President Putin a pass in 
the areas of democracy and competition are well 
documented. But the United States has also been 
more eager to secure energy supplies from Russia 
than to pressure the Kremlin into reforming its 
economy. The EU and the United States have for too 
long ignored the non-competitive and political 
aspects of Russia’s energy export policies. This is 
due in part to competition by Western companies for 
exploration and production rights in Russia. How 
much thought has been given to the potential power 
of Gazprom to control the gas markets in Central 
Europe following the completion of the Baltic 
pipeline system? Under the German-Russian 
agreement, Gazprom will be able to buy significant 
shares in Germany’s gas companies. Will this allow 
Gazprom to veto shipments of gas from Germany to 
Poland if the Poles have a dispute with Gazprom over 
price or availability? Could the increased power of 
Gazprom be used to stop liquid natural gas (LNG) 
receiving plants from being constructed in Poland, 
Latvia or even in Germany? If the EU decides to 
implement its long-awaited requirement for member 
states to have more gas storage, will this be possible 
now that the EU has blessed the Baltic pipeline 
system designed to bypass Poland and the Baltic 
States? What about Russian purchases of gas from 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan that are 
clearly designed to deny the West the ability to buy 
                                                        
11 Sally Bogle, “Gazprom, E.ON, BASF Begin 
Construction Work on NEGP, May Offer 9% to New 
Investor”,  World Markets Analysis, World Markets 
Research Centre, 12 December 2005.  
directly or at prices negotiated between producer and 
consumer, rather than working through Gazprom?
12 
Are these moves by the Kremlin compatible with 
WTO membership? It is hard to imagine that they 
are. 
Gazprom is now attempting to pressure Bulgaria into 
breaking a binding agreement on gas price and 
availability that is in force until 2010.
13 A test for the 
EU will be whether it backs up this soon-to-be 
member state with political support. So far, there is 
no sign that Brussels will intervene. Perhaps 
Bulgaria, as a member of NATO, should put the issue 
of energy security on the agenda of the North 
Atlantic Council, which concerns itself with issues 
that go far beyond the narrow one of military 
inviolability. Of course, other member states will 
have to step forward in the Council and support a 
policy discussion of the issues surrounding Russia’s 
aggressive energy policies. Poland, the Baltic States, 
and Romania might be so inclined. 
EUROPE’S GAS PIPELINE NETWORK 
 
Source: Inogate (EU oil and gas transport co-operation 
programme) via BBC News. 
No Big Winners in the ‘Gas War’ 
That brings us to the Russia-Ukraine ‘gas war’ that 
was allegedly resolved to the satisfaction of both 
sides on January 4. Russia’s political agenda in using 
gas prices to punish the pro-Western Yushchenko 
government is clear from statements made by 
Russian supporters of Gazprom’s hard line and from 
remarks by Russia’s few remaining reformers. Few 
people familiar with political and economic relations 
between Russia and Ukraine believe that this 
agreement will last very long.
14 Moscow’s 
                                                        
12 “Gazprom Established Control Over All Gas 
Resources of Three Asian Republics”, The Russian Oil 
and Gas Report, 14 November 2005.  
13 “Bulgaria Refuses to Review Gas Contract with 
Russia’s Gazprom”, Agence France Presse, 6 January 
2006.  
14 Fred Weir, “Russia-Ukraine Gas Standoff”, Christian 
Science Monitor, 3 January 2006.  4 | Keith C. Smith 
 
requirement that all gas to Ukraine be contracted 
through the non-transparent company RosUkrEnergo, 
the direct successor to the even less-transparent 
EuralTransGas, raises questions about the reliability 
of future European gas supplies that originate in 
Central Asia. In light of past actions, no one should 
have been surprised by Moscow’s tough approach to 
Kiev. One can make a good case that Russia should 
move towards charging market prices to importing 
countries. And, an equally good case can be made 
that it is in the long-term interest of Ukraine and 
other importers to move in the direction of paying 
world prices. Once market prices are reached, 
Moscow’s political leverage will decrease. A four-
fold overnight increase in price from $50 to $230 per 
1,000 cubic meters, however, is not justified, 
particularly in light of the 2004 agreement between 
the Kuchma government and Gazprom, which locked 
prices in until 2010.
15  
More important, however, is that no one knows what 
the real market price of Russian gas and oil would be 
if a transparent situation existed within Russia’s 
exporting companies. If Russian consumers were 
forced to pay prices that were significantly more than 
one-tenth of what Moscow claims to be the world 
market price, domestic demand would drop and 
additional Russian oil and gas would be placed on the 
international market. Does the $47 per 1,000 cubic 
meters charged to Belarus have any relationship to 
the market, or does the Kremlin consider it an 
‘internal price’? These are all questions that need 
greater discussion in both Brussels and Washington. 
Ukraine Needs to Act to Strengthen its 
Own Hand 
Ukraine’s politicians, however, deserve some of the 
blame for the present situation. Kiev has allowed 
corrupt oligarchs to continue their control over gas 
deliveries from Russia. More damaging in the long 
run is the Yushchenko government’s lack of 
movement in developing a level playing field for 
domestic and foreign energy investors. Here again, a 
few powerful individuals, most with close ties to 
Russia, have successfully kept out Western 
competitors. Ukraine could substantially reduce its 
dependency on Russia through rapid reforms that 
permit open tenders for exploration rights and by 
adopting a welcoming atmosphere for legitimate 
foreign energy investors. Seismic studies demonstrate 
that the country possesses considerable gas – both 
on-shore and in the Black Sea. The present 
                                                        
15 Daniel Kurdelchuk, Olexander Malinovsky and Inna 
Novak, “A European Approach to Ukraine’s Gas 
Dilemma: Road map to solve the dilemma”, Mirror-
Weekly, International Social Political Weekly, No. 49 
(577), 17-23 December 2005.  
government in Kiev, however, inherited a difficult 
situation from the Kuchma administration. Two-
thirds of the refineries processing three-fourths of the 
country’s oil are in the hands of Russian companies.
16 
Almost 100% of the refined product that is exported 
is produced in Russian-owned companies. All of 
Ukraine’s nuclear plants depend on Russian nuclear 
fuel rods. Victor Chernomyrdin, the former CEO of 
Gazprom, as Moscow’s ambassador to Kiev, has 
been very effective at promoting Russian energy 
interests and at keeping out potential Western 
competitors. 
Instead, the cosy relationship between Russian and 
Ukrainian energy interests persists, even after the 
New Year’s Day reduction of gas supplies. Talk by 
the Yushchenko government over the past year about 
diversifying imports and stopping corruption in the 
energy sector has resulted in little follow-through.
17 
Few economists see the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline 
project or the NABUCCO gas pipeline project, which 
would go from Iran/Azerbaijan through Turkey to 
Austria, as realistic alternatives in the short or 
medium term. A more serious and immediate 
solution would be for the Yekhanurov government to 
embark on a crash programme to improve energy 
efficiency and to open the country’s oil and gas fields 
to Western investors. Unfortunately, Ukraine’s 
forthcoming parliamentary elections in March have 
resulted in a high degree of paralysis on the part of 
the country’s decision-makers. 
The West Needs to Act as Well 
The West, including the EU and the United States, 
needs to quickly rethink its energy and non-energy 
policies with Russia. The two cannot be separated. 
The world does Russia no favour by ignoring the 
monopoly and uncompetitive nature of this energy 
relationship. The West does have the economic and 
political leverage to force Russia to become more 
transparent and commercial in its foreign energy 
policies. It cannot allow Moscow to threaten the 
security of Europe, particularly the new democracies 
of Central Europe, through neglect or unwillingness 
to face down the new imperial mindset in the 
Kremlin. 
 
                                                        
16 “Ukrainian Oil Specialist Against Building of More 
Oil Refineries”, ITAR-TASS, 20 May 2005  
17 “Ukrainian president outlines challenges at public 
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